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ABSTRACT
MARY MITCHELL PURVIS: Whose Right Is It? The Supreme Court and the Second
Amendment Right to Bear Arms
(Under the direction of Dr. John W. Winkle III)

In this thesis, I describe the history of debate surrounding the interpretation of the Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution, leading up to the United States Supreme
Court weighing in on the issue in the case of District of Columbia v. Heller(2009). To
find information for my study I examined many scholarly historical and legal journals on
Second Amendment interpretation. I chose to use as my sources journals which I felt
were most representative of the oppposing sides in the debate. I also gained information
from newspaper articles on the Heller case as it evolved, both to learn about the
background of the case and, after the case was announced, to learn about the effects of
the case. I also examined texts of specific court cases, including, most notably, Heller,
Miller, and Emerson. Of note, I spoke briefly with Mr. Heller and his lawyers outside the
Supreme Court just after the Court announced its decision. They were helpful in guiding
me to the importance of Emerson both in providing a pathway for the Heller case to reach
the Supreme Court, and in how its arguments had such an influence on the Court’s final
opinion. I found that the lower court rulings of Silviera and Emerson were influential in
the issue reaching the Supreme Court because of their opposing interpretations of the
meaning of the Second Amendment and because of the extensive research they both used
to support their disputing claims. I examine the opinion of the Supreme Court in District
of Columbia v. Heller(2009) and the extent of its influence. While the decision was
landmark because it definitively interpreted the Second Amendment right to bear arms as
individual, the ruling’s practical effect so far has been limited.
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people and for what public policy options are available to legislators. Most people believe
that, at the very least, the Second Amendment protects state militias from being disarmed
by the federal government. The power of the states to maintain militias is an important
aspect of a federal system in which power is shared between the country’s federal and
state governments. It prevents the federal government from unfairly usurping too much
power for itself at the detriment of the states. While some believe that this is as far as the
right goes, others believe that the Amendment protects the right of individuals to keep
and bear arms for personal use as well, whether it be for self-defense or even for purely
recreational use, such as hunting.
People on either side of the debate tend to hold strong convictions about their
interpretation of the right, because its interpretation has serious consequences for
American society. On the one hand, collective right proponents tend to believe that the
right to arms does not belong to the individual, or if it does, that it only does so in
connection with one’s involvement with a militia. Thus they believe that legislative
bodies have great leeway in regulating the right, and that more regulation of weapons
consequently leads to a safer society through decreased violent crime and gun accidents.
On the other hand, individual right proponents believe legislatures have much less
authority to regulate the right. They believe that the Amendment gives the personal right
to bear arms and that almost any legislation restricting it thus violates their
constitutionally protected right. People with this view also often believe that private gun
ownership can actually decrease violent crime, if citizens may own weapons to use for
self-defense.

Although the interpretation of the Second Amendment had been and still is a
constant topic of debate in scholarly circles for quite some time, the Supreme Coiut and
lower courts had given it significantly less attention over the span of its existence.
Supreme Court commentary on the right to bear arms before 2008 was limited, but
seemed to indicate an inclination to support the collective right stance. Lower courts
followed this lead, supporting this stance, and consequently upheld gun control laws
perhaps to a greater extent than Supreme Court precedent actually required.
In the 2008 ruling District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court finally
stepped in to give an authoritative interpretation of the right. In this study I examine
several important aspects of this case and of its treatment by the Court. The Heller case is
the most pivotal interpretation of the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms to date, and
thus is significant for a variety of reasons. Most notably it ends the centuries of debate
regarding which interpretive model should be used to apply the Second Amendment. As a
result of this, it also redefines the reasoning courts should use when faced with
determining the constitutionality of federal gun control laws; and, while it does not go so
far as to establish a standard of scrutiny for courts to use in doing so, it opens the door to
new cases in which such a standard will almost certainly be established. The Court also
does not rule on whether the Second Amendment should be incorporated (or applied) to
the states, but similarly sets the stage for such action to occur.
The second chapter of this thesis details the historical background of the debate
sLiiTOunding the right to keep and bear arms. This is essential to an understanding of just
how extensive scholarship on the issue had grown to be, and as a result, how
controversial. It also allows one to understand more fully the interpretive options

3

available to the Supreme Court when it issued its definitive opinion on the Amendment in
Heller.
The third chapter then describes why, after centuries of debate, the Court decided
to accept a Second Amendment case when it did. Dissension in federal circuit courts over
the Amendment’s interpretation played an essential role in this timing. Conflicting lower
court decisions, in United States v. Emerson and in Silviera v. Lockyer, were also of
extreme significance because they backed their interpretations of the right with thorough
examinations of the right’s history and the application of past precedent. This chapter
also describes the Court’s previously most notable statement on the Second Amendment,
in United States v. Miller, which in fact was not as conclusive a ruling as many lower
courts interpreted it to be, and which Emerson placed in a whole new light.
This leads up to a look at the treatment of the Second Amendment right by the
Supreme Court specifically through the case of District of Columbia v. Heller. The fourth
chapter points out which arguments of Second Amendment debate the Court values most
in its determination that the right is personal and belongs to individuals. This chapter also
explains how the Court manages to reconcile its ruling with past precedents, and how it
applies its interpretive standard to the statutes at issue in this case. It also provides a look
at the main points in the dissents, in which the justices give just as thorough of an
examination into the same types of factors as the majority, such as the Amendment’s
history, language, and grammatical structure. Yet interestingly enough, in so doing they
arrive at the conclusion that the right is individual, hut linked inextricably to maintenance
ofa m ilitia.
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In the final chapter of the study, a detailed look is given into the apparent effects
of the Court’s ruling in Heller. This chapter describes the significance of the Court’s
ruling to case law on the Second Amendment right to bear arms, but also notes how
limited are the practical effects the case is having on actions of the lower federal judiciary
to uphold Congressional gun control statutes. This is in pait because of what the Court
failed to do—establish a standard of scrutiny and nationalize the Amendment to the
states. However, while the Court’s ruling in Heller did not do these things, it paved the
way for these issues to be defined, as they will be the likely result of litigation
challenging gun control laws in response to Heller.
To find information for my study I examined many scholarly historical and legal
journals on Second Amendment interpretation. I chose to use as my sources journals
which I felt were most representative of the oppposing sides in the debate. I also gained
information from newspaper articles on the Heller case as it evolved, both to learn about
the background of the case and, after the case was announced, to learn about the effects
of the case. I also examined texts of specific court cases, including, most notably, Heller,
Miller, and Emerson. Of note, I spoke briefly with Mr. Heller and his lawyers outside the
Supreme Court just after the Court announced its decision. They were helpful in guiding
me to the importance of Emerson both in providing a pathway for the Heller case to reach
the Supreme Court, and in how its arguments had such an influence on the Court’s final
opinion.
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CHAPTER II: THE HISTORY OF SECOND AMENDMENT DEBATE

To truly comprehend the impact of the Heller decision it is important to
understand its place in the larger context of debate surrounding the meaning of the
Second Amendment. Before the Supreme Court addressed the Amendment in Heller,
there was far from a consensus on exactly whose “right to keep and bear arms” it should
protect and how far such a right should extend. The near silence that the Supreme Court
held on the issue for over two centuries left much room for scholarly debate on the topic
and for differing opinions regarding whether and to what extent the right might be
properly restricted through legislation.
When the Supreme Court agreed to take up the case of District of Columbia v.
Heller, the task it accepted was thus not merely to clarify through case law some widely
accepted interpretation of the Amendment. The outcome of what precedent the Court
would set was not a foregone conclusion, but rather just the opposite, as later evidenced
by the resulting 5-4 split in the ruling. At the outset of the case, the long history of
Second Amendment debate presented the Court with two prevailing options of
interpretation from which to choose. While it may seem surprising that centuries of
debate had not resulted in an agreement on the Amendment’s meaning, it is really quite
understandable considering the ambiguity of both the Amendment’s text itself and its
historical context.
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The vagueness found in these two aspects of the Amendment split opinions on its
inteipretation into two main camps: those who espoused the right as individual and those
who considered it a collective right. It is important to note that proponents on each side of
the opposing arguments looked to the same data and information to arrive at their
separate conclusions. This disparity was possible for a number of reasons including,
importantly, insufficient records of debate on the right during the formative period of the
Constitution. This lack of insight into the Amendment’s origin made it necessary to look
to the text of the Amendment itself and evidence of how the Framers would probably
have perceived the right to bear arms. However, these methods of inquiry did not lead to
a general consensus on the issue because the ambiguity of the text and the duplicity of the
right’s historical context are capable of being construed to support opposite
interpretations.
Proponents of the individual right interpretation often assert that the purpose of
the Amendment is to protect the right of the individual to bear arms by preventing
disarmament by the government. Many also think that such an interpretation is necessary
to support an individual’s right to self defense. On the other hand, scholars in support of
the collective right interpretation have linked the right exclusively to its relationship to
militia service and not to any inherent natural right to keep and bear arms, leaning heavily
on the importance of the prefatory clause to the Amendment’s meaning in support of this
claim.
The meaning implied by the Amendment’s grammatical structure has been one of
the factors at issue between the two sides of the debate. The only amendment in the Bill
of Rights with a preamble (Epstein and Walker 402), the two camps disagree over
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whether the two clauses serve independent purposes or whether the second clause, “the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed,” is dependent upon the
first, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State.” Collective
right proponents support the latter interpretation. They contend that “these words do not
amount to a casual ‘prefatory’ phrase, as some expounders of the individual rights
position claim, but an important qualification to the right itself’(Epstein 407). Steven J.
Heyman suggests that “one virtue of this interpretation is that it is able to read the
language of the Amendment as a coherent whole,[while] by contrast, supporters of the
individual right interpretation are forced to argue that the Amendment ‘was meant to
accomplish two distinct goals’: to secure an individual right to arms and to recognize the
importance of the militia”(Heyman 277).
Individual rights scholars, however, do not believe that these are the only two
interpretive options of the Amendment’s sentence structure. They contend that, though
the presence of the preamble seems to make its tme intention less obvious, it is in fact
meant to protect a personal right to bear arms. Leonard W. Levy suggests that the
preamble, with its mention of a militia, does not exclude, but rather goes hand in hand
with providing for an individual right, because “militias were possible only because the
people were armed and possessed the right to be armed. The right does not depend on
whether militias exist”(Levy 135). Rather than the personal right dependent upon militia
involvement, he argues that the presence of militias is dependent upon the ability of the
individual citizen to keep and bear arms.
However, the opposing sides interpret not only the sentence structure of the
Amendment, but also the vocabulary in its text to reach contradictory results. The
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ambiguity of certain terms and phrases the Framers used in crafting the Second
Amendment allows for arguments to be made in support of either case. Collective right
proponents make their case by contending that use of the term “people” implies the right
is communal, and that use of the phrase “to bear arms” connotes militia service.
Individual right supporters, conversely, consider the words “militia” and “people” as
referring to all individual citizens, not just to a select group(Buechner 7-8). They also
believe that military connotation of the Amendment’s language does not frame the right’s
purpose, because “if all it meant was the right to be a soldier or serve in the military, it
would hardly be a cherished right and would never have reached constitutional status in
the Bill of Rights(Levy 135).
The notion of a right to bear arms, however, evolved long before the phrase found
its way into the United States Bill of Rights. Advocates of both the collective right
viewpoint and the individual right viewpoint cited the historical context of the right to
bear arms as supporting their stance. They examine the history of the right in England, in
the colonial period, at the time of the Constitution’s ratification and consequent drafting
of the Bill of Rights, among other contexts.
Lawrence Delbert Cress, for example, points out that in Great Britain the right to
bear arms was not universal. He mentions Andrew Fletcher’s belief that the best protector
of public liberty was “a good militia” and not the “armed individual”(Cress 25). He also
cites that after Great Britain’s Glorious Revolution, the nation adopted a Bill of Rights
prohibiting a standing army and allowing Protestants to participate in military affairs
not, as some believe, giving an individual right to bear arms to all citizens. Even the right
of the Protestants to have arms was subject to limitation and regulation. It was intended
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for the purpose of maintaining a stable government and not for private use. Cress believes
that indicators such as these frame the English right to arms as collective, and asserts that
this train of thought provided the basis for the American right(Cress 26).
However, individual right proponents look at historical facts as well, and point out
English requirements that some citizens be armed. They too recognize that the American
right to arms is an “inlieritance from England” and support their stance by looking at the
right in this context, but arrive at a different conclusion. They note that early English
monarchs such as Henry II and Henry III expected all adult subjects to keep arms and to
use them when necessary, in essence to act as a citizen police force and army(Levy 136).
In the 1600s the English government placed strict restrictions on the right, which
incensed the citizenry and eventually led to the right’s protection by law through the
creation of the English Bill of Rights. Although it did only secure the right for
Protestants, individual right scholars note that England was 98 percent Protestant, and
that Parliament clearly meant for the right to be individual(Levy 137).
In his article “The History of the Second Amendment,” David E. Vandercoy
provides an in depth look into events in the Tudor and the Stuart periods of English
history with pertinent implications for the development of the right to arms. He notes that
the Stuart period was of particular importance in “shaping the political theory of the
American revolutionary leaders,” and concludes that historical evidence indicates that the
right in this era should legally be interpreted as individual(Vandercoy 3). He does
recognize that period literature “indicates that the intended purpose was to provide both
an individual and a collective right with the collective right being the most important,”
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and he states that the only way to ensure the preservation of the collective right was to
give the right to individuals through the Bill of Rights (Vandercoy 7).
Vandercoy then proceeds to consider development of the right in American
colonial times and how it too supports the individual right model. He examines the
politics of the founding fathers, studying the Federalist and Antifederalist viewpoints.
Both understood the link between arms and liberty, but disagreed as to what provisions
would be necessary to protect the right to arms(Vandercoy 8). Antifederalists believed
that the Constitution not including a bill of rights gave the federal government the
opportunity to infringe upon liberty. Federalists did not recognize this as so much of a
threat because they assumed an armed populace that could protect itself from tyrannical
action. The Antifederalists insisted upon a Bill of Rights, while the Federalists believed
this would be a harmful move “because it could encourage a claim that powers not
expressly stated had been granted;’* however “both sides not only agreed that the people
had a right to be armed,[but also]...assumed the existence of an armed population as an
essential element to preserving liberty”(Vandercoy 10-11). The Constitution’s
ratification process showed a fear “that creation of a select militia...would be
accompanied by disarmament of the people in general” and state convention dialogue
shows that many wanted recognition of the right to bear arms to be added to the
Constitution (Vandercoy 11-12).
Vandercoy then proceeds to examine the differing opinons of Federalists and
Antifederalists on the role of states in the new government and its implications for the
right. The Antifederalists and Federalists feared both state and national government, but
the Antifederalists believed that “retention of power by the states was necessary to secure
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the rights of the people,” which would include the right to arms(Vandercoy 14). Thus
state constitutions of this era provided for arms rights, and examining these reveals that
“in context, providing for the militia...appears to be the functional equivalent of
providing each individual with the right to bear arms”(Vandercoy 14).
Ultimately the right to bear arms was added to the Constitution by the Second
Amendment. Individual right proponents believe that Madison’s notes show that he
meant the right to be personal; however, collective right proponents cite these and records
of committee revisions and Senate debate as supporting their stance (Cress 36). They also
refute the claims that state constitutions gave an individual right. Rather, they note the
emphasis the constitutions place upon the necessity of having a militia to ensure liberty
(Cress 29-30). Cress also cites vocabulary of the state constitutions in his argument, that
their use of the phrase “to bear arms” implied militia service, and their use of the term
“people” also showed intent of a collective right(30-31).
Advocates on both sides of the issue cite natural rights theories alongside their
historical examinations as supporting their viewpoint on the right to bear arms. Natural
rights theorists make a distinction between an individual’s natural rights, that are
universal and inalienable, and legal rights, which exist only because of their creation in
the laws of a society. According to natural rights philosophy, a government or society has
the rightful power to give to or deprive the individual of legal rights as it sees fit, but does
not have the fair power to deprive an individual of his or her natural rights. However, the
application of natural rights theory is not as simple as it first may sound, because there is
no consensus as to what rights should, in fact, be considered natural and inalienable.

12

In short, supporters of the individual right model claim that the right to selfdefense is inalienable. In his article “Natural Rights and the Second Amendment,
Steven J. Heyman describes how such individual right supporters also contend that the
Second Amendment “was intended at least in part, to enable individuals to exercise their
natural right to self-defense”(Heyman 240). However,supporters of a collective right
find this interpretation of natural rights tradition to be faulty. They contend that, while
man may have this right in a state of nature, once entering society he gives it up to be
subject to regulation in return for obtaining protection by the law (Heyman 241). Thus,
“although the people retained the right to resist tyranny [once entering society], this was a
right that belonged to the community as a whole rather than to individuals”(Heyman
241). Heyman defends this view of natural rights and the Second Amendment in his
article.
To reach his conclusion, Heyman examines the writings of two prominent natural
rights theorists, John Locke and Sir William Blackstone. He first applies Locke’s version
of natural rights found in his Second Treatise of Government to the right to bear arms,
and then Blackstone’s account of the right, which he believes supplies the strongest
framework through which to evaluate the natural rights meaning of the Second
Amendment.
From examining Locke’s work, Heyman first concludes that it does not recognize
an individual right to self-defense(Heyman 241). In his Second Treatise, Locke first
looks at the rights of man in a “state of nature,” or pre-govemmental society. In this state,
Locke acknowledges a right to self-preservation for the use of protecting one’s other
inherent natural rights to life, liberty, and property and for protecting these rights of
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others as well. This is because these rights contribute to the perpetuation of mankind, and
in the absence of a government or civil stmcture to ensure their protection, using force to
do so may in fact be necessary. Heyman suggests that it is for this reason that individual
right proponents believe that Locke’s philosophy supports their stance—they assume
weapons and personal possession of them is necessary for this purpose(Heyman 242).
He finds fault in this assumption, however, because Locke views this type of
unrestricted state of nature as intolerable, and therefore the creation of a social contract as
a necessary step. Upon entering the social contract, men give up the right of illimitable
self-preservation and agree to be bound by the societal laws for preservation of the
community, laws designed to have the same end result of protecting basic natural rights.
Thus, self-preservation by the personal use of force is replaced by protection established
through the laws of civil society. The individual must give up the right when entering the
social contract because, once an equitable system ofjustice has been created, use of such
force outside of the system could violate the rights of others. Therefore, the individual
right to use force is, in fact, of necessity an alienable right(Heyman 243-244). It is a
means to the end result of self-preseiwation, both of self and of the community, and thus
has not the inherent value of an inalienable right(Heyman 246).
An anomaly to this general rule arises in the event that established law fails to
accomplish its protective duty. In this case:
Locke holds that when an individual faces an imminent attack on his life
or person, he has a right to use all necessary force to defend himself. To
this extent, the right to self-defense is an inalienable one which is retained
within civil society,[and] if this is true...does it not follow that
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individuals have an inalienable right to own arms for self-defense?
(Heyman 245).
The logic of this train of tliought provides individual right proponents with an argument
of natural rights theory support for their perspective. However, Heyman contends that
such reasoning is faulty and inconsistent with Lockean philosophy. He believes that the
solution to this quandary lies in the power of a legislature to regulate possession of
weapons as it sees fit for the good of the community, since personal weapon ownership
can be an enabler for assault as well as a mechanism for self-defense; therefore, the ruling
body must judge what amount of gun-control restriction would provide the most benefit
for its society(Heyman 245).
Although Heyman believes that Lockean natural rights philosophy does not
support an individual right to bear arms against personal attack, he goes on to consider
whether individuals possess this right as a means of defense “against the government
itself’ as a part of the natural rights of resistance and revolution(Heyman 247). Lockean
philosophy holds that in the event that a government morphs from being legitimate into
working to the detriment of society, the natural right exists to revolt against this
government. The question with this train of thought, however, lies in whether this right to
rebellion belongs to all individuals or is a collective right belonging to the community.
Locke arrives at the conclusion that, although the right to resistance might in theory
belong to the individual, for practical purposes it should only belong to the community as
a whole for two reasons: firstly, because individual action would be almost certainly
doomed to failure, and, secondly, because unjustifiable resistance lacking community
support could occur. The same reasoning applies to Locke’s concept of revolution; the
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right to replace a tyrannical government with a new one is also communal in nature
(Heyman 248-249).
What, then, does Locke’s position on these two rights mean for a right to bear
arms? If the rights to rebellion and revolution are, as some contend, bestowed upon the
individual, then this offers support that a personal right to bear arms is necessary to
provide for these rights. Even if these rights belong to the commimity,then some right to
arms must exist pursuant to the possibility that they must be exercised. However,in this
case would the right be communal or individual? Heyman recognizes that Locke does not
comment directly on this matter, and he again states his belief that the right to regulate
arms possession should belong to the legislature, which will logically weigh the risks and
benefits implicit in the amount of regulation it places on the right, and then establish its
bounds in a constitution(Heyman 250).
In sum, proponents of the collective right model cite natural right tradition in
support of their stance because, by entering into a social contract, individuals give up
their right to provide for their own self-preservation in favor of allowing the community
to do so. Heyman also notes that although Locke’s theories support the legitimacy of
communal rebellion against tyrannical government through use of force, he does not
consider the use of such force as desirable but rather as a last resort, if other preventative
measures have failed. Locke believes that a properly formed and maintained government
structure is the best form of prevention. If government continues to act in the best interest
of its people and does “not transgress the limits established by the constitution and the
fundamental principles of natural law,’’ then the need for people to resist or revolt will be
less likely to materialize. He suggests a separation of government powers into legislative.
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executive, and judicial branches, each with checks on each other as an effective tool for
preventing tyranny, and thus revolution(Heyman 251-252).
The work of Sir William Blackstone also provides relevant commentary on the
placement of the right to bear arms within the framework of natural rights theory. Both
individual and collective right scholars claim support of their stance by gleaning evidence
from his Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland, which gives an in-depth look into
English constitutional tradition. Supporters of the individual right model note that
Blackstone distinguishes between absolute rights, “belonging to the person whether out
of society or in it,” and relative rights, that exist relative to the person’s existence in
society. They then contend that Blackstone considers the right to bear arms absolute, but
with both public and private purposes. According to Vandercoy:
The public purpose was resistance to restrain the violence of oppression;
the private was self-preservation...[and] Blackstone described this right as
necessary to secure the actual enjoyment of other rights which would
otherwise be in vain if protected only by the dead letter of the laws (7).
Individual right proponents also cite Blackstone’s statement that Englishmen’s
right to arms “is rooted in ‘the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the
sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of
oppression’”(Heyman 252). Blackstone wrote this as a comment on an article of the
English Bill of Rights of 1689 that is similar to the Second Amendment, and that likely
had an influence upon the drafting of the Amendment. As Blackstone was considered
'"the great authority on English common law in both England and America”(Heyman
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253), his interpretation of this article, so similar to the Second Amendment, would hold
great implications for its intended meaning.
Don Kates and Nelson Lund contend that Blackstone’s statement above shows
that he believed in the absolute right of the individual to keep and bear arms for selfpreservation. Joyce Malcolm supports this view as well, writing that Blackstone saw this
right as necessary to provide for “the ‘natural right of resistance and self preservation,’
and ‘to restrain the violence of oppression’”(Heyman 252). Therefore, “if Blackstone
interpreted this English provision in individual right terms, it would be important
evidence that the Second Amendment should be read in the same way”(Heyman 253).
Heyman, however, contends that this interpretation of Blackstone’s commentary
is incorrect, and that his writing actually provides strong support for a collective right
interpretation of the Amendment. He believes that viewing the work of Blackstone as a
cohesive whole, rather than just taking the excerpt referenced above at its face value,
leads to this conclusion and does not contradict with the statement, but in fact is
supported by it. He notes that Blackstone distinguishes between absolute rights and
auxiliary rights—those that exist in order to “protect and maintain inviolate the three
great and primary rights, of personal security, personal liberty, and private property”
(Heyman 256). He lists the right to arms as one of these auxiliary rights(Heyman 257).
In support of considering the right to arms communal, collective rights
scholarship also points out that Blackstone does not consider any rights exempt from
proper regulation, even the rights he does categorize as absolute. His perspective differs
from Locke’s in that he “emphasizes not the inalienability of natiual rights, but the
necessity for those rights to be regulated for the common good”(Heyman 256). The fact
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that even absolute rights can be properly subject to regulation, implies that the right to
bear arms would not be exempt from such regulation as well(Heyman 256).
The other auxiliary rights with which Blackstone lists the right to arms for
defense is also telling of the purpose of this right in the English constitution. The other
four rights listed all pertain to protecting the citizenry from tyrannical government, not to
personal self-defense, so it makes sense that the right to arms be intended for this purpose
as well. Collective right proponents also note that,just as natural rights can be further
classified into those communally and those individually held, thus so can their auxiliary
rights; and, if the right to resist tyranny is communal then it follows that the right to arms
is as well(Heyman 257-258). Also, Blackstone’s work, like Locke’s, indicates that he
considers the use of forceful resistance as a last resort, to be used only when a
government becomes tyrannical, thus violating the social contract, in which case the
people as a whole have the prerogative to revolt(Heyman 259-260).
When considering the implications of political theory on the right to arms, it is
also important to look at the ideology of republicanism. Robert E. Shalhope believes
knowledge of this school of thought is essential to be able to accurately view the right in
its context “of late-eighteenth-century American society”(Shalhope 601). Republican
thought links a nation’s ability to preserve liberty to the virtue of its citizens(Shalhope
601), and its “essence was that a citizenry could mle itself without the paternal guiding
hand of a monarch”(Vandercoy 7).
One of the most notable commentators on republicanism was the libertarian writer
James Burgh, who wrote Political Disquisitions^ which was published in 1774, and which
some say was more influential in America than the work of John Locke(Levy 138).
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Burgh “articulated the idea that the very character of the people—the cornerstone.,.of a
republican society—was related to the individual’s ability and desire to arm and defend
himself against threats to his person, his property, and his state”(Shalhope 604). Another
prominent republican theorist, James Harrington, held views similar to Burgh’s. He
believed that a population of armed individuals would be the best protector of a popular
government from both external and internal threats

a populace that possessed the land

and arms inevitably would retain political power as well as serving as the best defense
against the popular government’s enemies”(Vandercoy 8). Thus, proponents of the
individual right model cite republican ideology as a strength of their argument, in spite of
criticism from opponents. Cress accuses Shalhope of failing “to place citizenship...in a
context compatible with the republican theory of revolutionary America,” by
misunderstanding the term to mean all individuals (Cress 23). Rather citizenship was
partially defined by militia service, and armed individuals would threaten rather than
preserve liberty (Cress 23-24).
While scholars on the right to arms come down on one side or the other of the
original intent and proper interpretation of the Second Amendment,some on both sides
agree that current application should take into account a “new day in America.” Both the
culture and technology in the United States has changed such since the Founding Fathers
first drafted their version of a right to bear arms, that some scholars believe that this right
should in fact be limited, regardless of whether the original intent was for it to have strict
limitations or not. Shalhope believes that though he sees the right as originally intended
to be individual, he recognizes that society has changed so much since that time that now
another option might be more reasonable, if not necessary (Shalhope 613). Michael
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Busch, even made the prediction pxQ-Heller that the Court might even use the adaptive or
experiential approach to interpret the Constitution, understanding it as “a living, growing
document," and decide that concerns for safety in today’s world warrant a changing.
more limited view of the right to bear arms(Busch 367). However, while careful
attention must be given to interpret the Amendment in a way that is not harmful to
American society, at the same time, a proper application of the Amendment also would
not blatantly contradict its perceived meaning, or else risk the legitimacy of the
Constitution itself.
Just as D.C V. Heller was bom into an already robust and controversial debate on
the interpretation of the Second Amendment, it also did not arrive in a vacuum of any
court precedent. While the Supreme Court had not yet made a decisive, landmark mling
to proclaim its stance on the right to bear arms, it had addressed the issue before in the
case of United States v. Miller(1939), and just as its interpretation could not simply
ignore Constitutionality in light of social statistics, it also did not have the option of
paying no heed to this precedent without risking the loss of its own legitimacy as an
institution.
In the Miller decision the Court had, though not explicitly, seemed to endorse the
collective rights interpretation of the Second Amendment. Following in suit, therefore,
many lower courts across the United States tended to side in favor of governments when
Second Amendment suits were brought against them. This was,for the most part,
standard practice; however, a change in this pattern became what would eventually lead
to the Court accepting Heller’s case and going on to provide the most authoritative
definition of Second Amendment rights yet put forth.
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Before Heller clarified the issue, however, the precedent that Miller set provided
only a limited interpretation of the Amendment at best. This case began when Jack Miller
and Frank Layton were charged with violating the National Firearms Act of 1934, which
included a requirement about gun registration. The two men had transported an
unregistered sawed-off shotgun from Oklahoma to Arkansas (thus in interstate
commerce) and were consequently brought to trial in a federal district court. The district
court in this case ruled that the applicable part of the statute was unconstitutional in light
of the Second Amendment. The case then made its way to the Supreme Court on direct
appeal {Miller).
The Supreme Court overturned the decision of the district court, and linked the
right to bear arms to militia service in its unanimous opinion authored by Justice
McReynolds. It put forth the standard that the Second Amendment protected the right to
arms that have “some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia”(Buechner 6). The Court upheld the legitimacy of the provision of the
Firearms Act in question because the defense failed to prove that a sawed off shotgun had
any such reasonable relationship to the upkeep of a militia, and therefore the requirement
of its registration was not out of line. The Miller Court’s basis for applying the
Amendment, however, is somewhat vague in that “it indicates that there is a connection
between the right to keep and bear arms and the militia, but does not explore the logical
conclusions of its holding, leaving open the question of at what point regulation or
prohibition of firearms would violate the strictures of the Amendment”(Halstead 4).
In light of the Court’s reasoning that the purpose of the Amendment was “to
assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness [of state militias and that! it
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must be interpreted with that end in view”(Epstein and Walker 405), it seems a natural
path for following courts to abide by the collective rights model. But in doing so, lower
courts began to take adherence to this model further than the Miller decision actually
required. Through its opinion in Miller, as Epstein and Walker state, the Court only
"\seems to favor the collective rights interpretation”(Epstein and Walker 402). While the
ailing does take into account and give value to the Amendment’s prefatory clause, what it
does not do is go into specific detail as to how the clause qualifies the right. Therefore,
rather than offering a definitive answer to the question of how the Amendment defines
and protects the right to bear arms, it really only took its exposition as far as was
necessary to reach a conclusion in this case.
The decision in Miller has been said by some to be an illustration of a third stance
on the right to bear arms, rather than fitting into one of the two primary models. This
position, though known as the “sophisticated collective right model,” is really a
combination of the two more principal viewpoints. It “posits that individuals have a right
under the Second Amendment to own and possess firearms, but only to the extent that
such ownership and possession is connected to service in a state militia”(Halstead 2). It
does not take the militia requirement to the extreme that some collective rights
proponents do who believe the Amendment only protects state maintenance of organized
militias; and, it does recognize the existence of an individual right, but requires it to have
a relation to militia service.
The scholars that recognize this three-model system of Second Amendment
interpretation, rather than the typical two-model classification,have the same concept of
the individual right model, but split the collective right model into two separate and more
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naiTow categories. They do this rather than placing(1)the belief that an individual has a
right to own and possess firearms insofar as these relate to state militia service and(2)the
belief that the right only pertains to protection of states’ abilities to have militias, under
the one umbrella of the collective right model, as many scholars do. They leave the latter.
more extreme of these two categories with the “collective right” title and christen the
former, more moderate model the “sophisticated collective right” model, which is
described above in relation to Miller(Halstead 2).
The Miller ruling does seem to most closely fit into this one of the three models
noted by T. J. Halstead, or into the collective right model of the two model system.
However, scholars have also pointed out that the lack of detail that the ruling provides
can allow for its purposes to be misconstrued to support interpretations it never perhaps
intended. For example, some have suggested that it could actually be used to support
protection of the individual right to own extreme types of weaponry if the weapons were
of the sort used in militias. As such, Epstein and Walker say that individual rights
scholars interpret the Court’s mling as saying “that guns that could be useful in a militia
enjoy constitutional protection”(Epstein and Walker 406-407); and, according to Sanford
Levinson:
Ironically, Miller can be read to support some of the most extreme antigun control arguments, e.g. that the individual citizen has a right to keep
and bear bazookas, rocket launchers, and other armaments that are clearly
relevant to modem warfare, including, of course, assault weapons.
Arguments about the constitutional legitimacy of a prohibition by
Congress of private ownership of handguns or, what is much more likely.
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assault rifles, might turn on the usefulness of such gims in military
settings”(Epstein and Walker 407).
The ambiguity found in the Court’s ruling in Miller led to skepticism of the
tendency that lower courts had to view it as a mandate to strictly follow the collective
right model in determining the constitutionality of gun control laws (Epstein and Walker
405-406). While debatable in its merit, however, this trend continued with little notable
deviation and no further important rulings on the matter from the Supreme Court until the
end of the twentieth century. Not until then would the Court accept the task of sifting
through the abundance of complicated and often vague evidence on the right and make its
opinion known.
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CHAPTER III; PATHWAY TO THE SUPREME COURT

Pro-gun groups and individuals had been pushing for a change in the status quo of
gun control laws for many years. They believed that many of these laws violated their
Second Amendment rights, and they were rarely granted any relief in lower courts due to
the Miller precedent. Their pleas to the Supreme Court to consider the issues also went
unanswered until 2007, when the Roberts Court accepted the case of D.C. v. Heller.
Many factors contributed to the Supreme Court accepting a case on Second Amendment
interpretation when it did. The Court receives thousands of appeals to hear cases yearly,
which gives it great leeway in determining the subject matter of which cases they choose
to accept—usually granting writs of certiorari to only around a hundred of the cases per
year. There are certain qualities of cases that typically increase their likelihood of being
accepted by the Court, such as the existence of conflict in lower court decisions on an
issue or the United States government being a party in the case, Heller's unique
combination of qualities that led it to the Supreme Court included some of these
trademark characteristics, importantly, disparity in lower court decisions and, while the
U.S. government was not one of the two parties in the case, it was extremely involved—
presenting the Court with briefs and even being allowed time to present its case in oral
argument. These factors among others likely influenced the Court’s decision to hear
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Heller's

case when it did, after years of silently giving credence to the Miller precedent

thiough its inaction.
In his 2003 article about the case United States v. Emerson, Michael Busch gives
helpful insight into the role this case would play in bringing Second Amendment debate
back into the sights of the Supreme Court. This case began in August of 1998 with the
divorce proceedings of Sacha and Timothy Joe Emerson. Mrs. Emerson applied for a
temporary restraining order in addition to her petition for divorce, a typical practice in
Texas divorce proceedings (Linder 1), and was granted the order on September 14, 1998
(Busch 349). As a part of this order, according to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), Mr. Emerson
was not allowed to possess a firearm (Linder 1). Emerson violated this part of the statute,
and was indicted on December 8,1998(Busch 349). Faced with this accusation, Emerson
alleged that the federal statute violated his Second Amendment rights, and that therefore
his indictment should be dismissed (Linder 1).
The case first went to trial in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas, and the court granted Emerson’s motion to dismiss {Emerson). Both the
decision of this court and the reasoning behind it were departures from the tendency of
most lower courts to uphold federal gun control laws using collective right arguments
that they said were in accord with the precedent set by Miller(Linder 1). In his opinion,
district court judge Sam R. Cummings used many of the common arguments of
individual right proponents to support declaring the statute unconstitutional, and he also
gave a different interpretation of Miller's meaning—alleging that it did not endorse either
the collective right or individual right model, but only gave a narrow solution for the case
that was at hand (Linder 5).
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On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the court overruled the decision of the trial court,
reinstating Emerson’s indictment. However, while the outcome did not deviate from the
trend to uphold gun regulations, the appeal court’s reasoning in its opinion

was

groundbreaking. Judge William Garwood wrote the opinion, and, like the trial court,
recognized the individual right to bear arms—and contended that such an interpretation
was in fact consistent with Miller. In the opinion, the court noted its departure from other
lower courts in its support of the individual right model. It said that these other courts had
reached contrary conclusions “on the erroneous assumption that

resolved that issue

lof which model to follow!” {Emerson). The court said that in fact, stare decisis did not
preclude, but actually supported an inteipretation of the right as individual in nature. The
government’s brief in Miller had provided two arguments in support of its gun-control
statute: first, that the Second Amendment confers only a collective right to arms, and
second, that the ‘“shotgun having a barrel of less than 18 inches in length’ as stated in the
National Firearms Act is not(or cannot merely be assumed to be)one of the ‘Arms
which the Second Amendment prohibits infringement of the right of the people to keep
and bear” {Emerson). Garwood suggests that in Miller the Supreme Court based its
reasoning only on the second of the government’s arguments, and that this supports an
individual right to arms, as long as they are of the kind that could be useful in militia
service.
The Fifth Circuit decision stated that courts rejecting the individual right model
also did so “without sufficient articulated examination of the history and text of the
Second Amendment” {Emerson). It then goes on itself to conduct such an examination,
first looking at the meanings of the words used in the Amendment itself, specifically
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“people.

bear Arms,” and “keep...Arms.” It argued that the meanings of these terms

support an individual right, and then that the Amendment’s sentence structure does as
well—that the preamble does not “mandate what would be an otherwise implausible
collective rights or sophisticated collective rights interpretation of the amendment”
{Emerson). Finally, in looking at the history of the Amendment, the circuit court also
decided that it found “nothing inconsistent with the conclusion that as ultimately
proposed by Congress and ratified by the states it was understood and intended in
accordance with the individual rights model” {Emerson).
Although it found the right to bear arms to be individual, the Fifth Circuit did note
that this right could be on occasion “subject to...limited, narrowly tailored specific
exceptions or restrictions for particular cases that are reasonable and not inconsistent with
the right of Americans generally to individually keep and bear their private arms as
historically understood in this country” {Emerson). Following this reasoning, the circuit
court decided that the law in Emerson’s case was reasonable and should be upheld, even
though Emerson himself originally had held an individual right to arms. Therefore, while
the Emerson decision itself did not create conflict in circuit courts, because it did uphold
the gun control law, it did, importantly open “the door for some circuit courts to hold
federal gun regulations unconstitutional”(Busch 351). Busch was incorrect in his
prediction that the Supreme Court would ultimately mle for a collective right
interpretation when it decided to address the Second Amendment’s meaning. However,
he coiTectly identified that the Court would end up needing to address Second
Amendment issues as a result of rulings whose reasoning would follow in Emerson'^
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footsteps and thus create an inconsistency across the country that would need to be
resolved (Busch 351).
As Busch predicted, the Fifth Circuit Court would not be the last to rule that the
Second Amendment bestows the individual with a personal right to arms, and the
Supreme Court would ultimately see the necessity of ruling on the issue. However, before
this, another circuit court decision occurred that held significance as far as treatment of
the Second Amendment in contemporary lower courts. In the case of Silveira v. Lockyer,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the constitutionality of a California ban on
assault weapons {Silveira). In this 2003 decision, the court directly addressed the
individual right conclusion proposed in Emerson,“engaging in its own substantive
analysis of the text of the Amendment, but reaching the opposite conclusion than that of
the Fifth Circuit,” that the Amendment bestows a collective right(Halstead 7). This court
claimed that prior court decisions ruling for the collective right stance had done so
without sufficient examination, but that its thorough look at historical and textual
evidence supports this conclusion (Halstead 7).
While “the holdings in Emerson and Silviera for the first time presented the
Supreme Court with two contemporaneous circuit court decisions that reached
fundamentally different conclusions regarding the protections afforded by the Second
Amendment,” the appeal to the Silviera case was not granted a writ of certiorari by the
Court (Halstead 8). The decision’s reasoning had created a split in lower courts on the
issue notable enough to suggest the need for Supreme Court intervention. However, this
case was not the right one for the Court to use to do this because, since both courts had
failed to strike down any firearm laws, a “clear and particularized conflict among the
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circuit courts” was lacking. Their rulings had similar practical applications to the gun
control laws, despite the differing logic in supporting their conclusions to uphold them
(Halstead 8).
With Emerson having introduced a convincing court interpretation of an
individual right to arms and Silviera having provided an also thorough decision in
support of the collective right, the time was ripe for a case that could make its way into
the hands of the Supreme Court. The case that would eventually do just that began under
the name of Parker v. District of Columbia. In this case, three District of Columbia gun
control ordinances came under fire. These ordinances, often referred to as the “Gun Ban,”
were a part of the 1975 Firearms Control Regulation Act(Halstead 8). The city’s
legislature enacted the ban in response to increasing gun violence in the city. It barred the
registration of handguns, required licenses for pistols, and mandated “that all legal
firearms...be kept unloaded and disassembled or trigger locked” {Parker).
In 2003, six plaintiffs sued the District of Columbia in Washington’s federal
district court for violating their right to “keep and bear aims” as provided for in the
Second Amendment {Parker). While the statutes in question often came into play
naturally in criminal cases involving illegal gun possession or use, the suit in this case
occurred much less organically. The plaintiffs in this case were handpicked by libertarian
lawyer Robert Levy, along with two other attorneys, one of whom, Alan Gura, would go
on later to argue their case in front of the Supreme Court(Manning). Levy manufactured
the case with this end goal in mind. Not at the time a resident of the District, nor even an
owner of a handgun. Levy expended the time and money necessary in pursuit of this goal
because he was “driven to defend constitutional rights he...[believed were] being
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trampled on by the District of Columbia’s strict ban on private ownership of handguns'
(Manning).
Levy was a frequent writer on gun rights, and he believed that the time had come
for the Supreme Court to give an answer to the long-debated questions surrounding the
meaning of the Second Amendment. He believed that it confered the individual with a
right to keep and bear arms for personal use, and decided that a challenge to the D.C.
laws would be the best opportunity for advancing such a case. To begin the process. Levy
and the others sought out a diverse group of plaintiffs by word of mouth. They did this,
he said, rather than latching onto some chance case, because they “didn’t want crack
heads and bank robbers to be poster boys for the Second Amendment”(Manning). Of the
group they found,“one was a gay man, another a black woman who felt threatened by
dmg dealers, another a white security guard”(Manning).
After the district court mled that the Amendment “does not give an individual a
right to gun ownership except where the individual is a member of an organized militia,
and granted the District’s motion to dismiss,” the plaintiffs proceeded to appeal their case
to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals {Parker). However, in its consideration of the case,
the appeals court decided that only Dick Heller had standing to sue, because he was the
only plaintiff who incurred harm by the city’s law (Manning). A security guard, Heller
had actually applied for a handgun license, while the others had merely expressed a
desire to have a handgun at home and had thus not had the Gun Ban enforced against
them (Buechner 3). The court ruled that Heller’s injury was such that he could challenge
all three of the provisions, as, should he become able to register a handgun, the other two
sections then “amount to further conditions on the [right] Heller desires”(Halstead 9).
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The court then proceeded to give its analysis of the Second Amendment’s
meaning by examining the text itself and also its historical context, in many ways similar
to the example set in Emerson. Like the Emerson court, the Parker court decided that the
right to bear arms is an individual right, not contingent upon actual militia service. It
declared that use of the phrase “the people” indicates this conclusion, noting that it is also
present in the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments,“and that ‘[i]t has never been
doubted that these provisions were designed to protect the rights of individuals''{Parker).
The court also examined the relationship between the Amendment’s two clauses and
found that the preamble in no way excludes an individual right to keep and bear arms—
this because “early Congresses recognized that the militia existed independently as ‘ablebodied men of a certain age,’ irrespective of any governmental creation”(Halstead 9).
Therefore, by not inextricably linking militia to the states, the court is able to argue that
the Amendment intends to ensure the individual’s personal right to keep and bear arms,
in order that a militia might be created out of an armed populace (Halstead 10). The court
also threw out the argument that the Second Amendment is not applicable to D.C.
because it is a federal enclave. It noted that the Supreme Court has held that the
Constitution and the rest of the Bill of Rights are applicable to the District, and that thus
the Second Amendment is as well (Halstead 10).
Finally, the appellate court considered the constitutionality of the Gun Ban itself
in light of its findings on the meaning of the Second Amendment. The Parker court
interpreted that Miller's precedent supports Second Amendment protection for “arms that
bear a ‘reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated
militia,’ and that were personally owned and ‘lineal descendents’ of weapons ‘in
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common use’ at the time Congress passed the amendment”(Buechner 3). It found that
handguns fit into these protected categories, and that the city’s restrictions violated the
Amendment because they were overly restrictive. Some restrictions on protected weapon
ownership are permissible—just as other protections in the Bill of Rights are subject to
reasonable regulation. However, the provisions at issue here all fell because their
practical application actually prohibited rather than simply regulated the individual’s
ability to keep and bear the protected arms in question (Halstead 11).
On September 4, 2007, the District of Columbia requested that the Supreme Court
grant the case a writ of certiorari, and that it agree to consider “[wjhether the Second
Amendment forbids the District of Columbia from banning private possession of
handguns while allowing possession of rifles and shotguns”(Halstead 12). Heller, now
the respondent, filed a brief in response to the District’s petition on October 4, 2007
(Halstead 12). Although the Heller team had won its case in the circuit court, it too urged
the Supreme Court to accept the case, that it might achieve its goal of the Court deciding
to “clearly define the relationship between the federal gun control laws and the Second
Amendment”(Oyez). However the question that Heller proposed the Court answer had a
different spin than the District’s—it urged the Court to decide *‘[w]hether the Second
Amendment guarantees law-abiding, adult individuals a right to keep ordinary, functional
firearms, including handguns, in their homes”(Halstead 12). Several groups including the
American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Civil Rights Union, and a few states also
filed briefs as amicus curiae encouraging the Court to accept the case (“Pleadings”).
The Supreme Court granted the case of District of Columbia v. Heller a petition
for certiorari on November 20, 2007(Buechner 3). It agreed to consider the question of
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“[wlhether the following provisions, D.C. Code §§ 7-2502.02(a)(4), 22-4504(a), and 72507.02, violate the Second Amendment rights of individuals who are not affiliated with
any state-regulated militia, but who wish to keep handguns and other firearms for private
use in their homes” {Heller). As the language of this question indicates, the Court had
finally reached the point where it was willing to directly address the meaning of the right
to keep and bear arms given in the Second Amendment.
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CHAPTER IV: HELLER’S CASE IN THE SUPREME COURT

The Court was willing in 2008 to take up the task of interpreting the Second
Amendment through Heller’s case, but it would do so in the face of the same
uncertainties and ambiguities through which previous scholars and courts had struggled.
As mentioned before, even after extensive scholarly research on the historical meaning of
the right to bear arms pve-Heller, there was far from a consensus on the right’s tme
original function or its proper role in modem society. Also, in its application, what little
precedent that the Court had previously set on the issue had been constmed in support of
both sides of the argument.
Although the controversial state of the Amendment’s interpretation did not allow
for the Court’s task to be clean-cut, the abundance of debate on the issue did provide the
Court with many interpretive options from which to glean support for the decision it
would ultimately make. In addition to having ample scholarly resources on the topic, the
Court also had a great resource in the many amicus briefs it received for the case, along
with the merit briefs submitted by the two sides and also the United States government.
Research in support of each side of debate on the Amendment was so thorough
and well-reasoned that the Court’s decision would not be simple. The controversial
nature of the issue at hand in this case is evidenced by the fact that the Court would end
up split in its decision, with five in the majority and four in the minority, which gave two
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dissenting opinions. Like proponents of the opposing models of the right’s interpretation.
the two sides on the Court looked at the same historical evidence and came to different
conclusions. Thus the method of reasoning that should be used in interpreting the Second
Amendment was not a main point of contention between the two sides, but using similar
styles of logic led them to conflicting results. This unique type of rift in Court opinion
can be seen clearly by looking at how the two sides attempt to refute each other’s
arguments point by point. It is also interesting to note how the merit briefs of the two
sides in the case proposed that the issue be framed, and how certain amicus briefs
proposed arguments that seem to have played a role in parts of the Court’s opinions.
The District of Columbia, in its petitioner’s brief, used several lines of reasoning
to support its contention that the Second Amendment did not condemn its laws on gun
control. The District argued that the right to bear arms is tied solely to a citizen’s service
in a state militia, thus endorsing the collective right model. To prove its case,“the
District’s brief marshaled detailed textual and historical information in much the same
manner as the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Silveird'(Halstead 13). The District then
contended that the Second Amendment in fact does not even apply to the laws in question
in this case, because they only applied to the city, and were not federal regulations. It
argued that the authors of the Amendment thought its purpose would be to preserve a
balanced system of federalism by protecting the right of states to form militias from
disarmament by the federal government(Halstead 13). Finally, the District also argued
that, even though it believed the right was collective, “its law should be allowed to
remain in force whether or not the amendment applies to individuals”(“Supreme Court”).
It noted that even rights belonging to individuals have been subject to reasonable
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regulation, and that its gun control statutes served the reasonable purpose of promoting
public safety (Halstead 13).
Halstead describes how Heller’s brief, on the other hand, argued that the Second
Amendment protects the right of the individual to keep and bear arms,“forwarding
textual and historically based arguments of the type that were found persuasive in
Emerson and Parker"(14). He also contended that well-regulated militias were not of
necessity linked to state control, and that thus private individuals could be allowed to be
armed apart from state militia service that they might be prepared to support extragovernmental militias. The respondent’s brief also used reasoning mirroring the Parker
opinion to explain why the District’s laws in particular should be considered
unconstitutional (Halstead 14). Heller’s side believed that the Court did not need to
designate a standard of review for regulation of the right in this case, because the laws at
hand prohibited the arms in question altogether rather than merely placing a restriction
upon them. It did argue though, that if a standard were to be used, it should be one of
strict scrutiny, not merely reasonableness (Halstead 14).
In its brief through the Department of Justice, the United States proposed a middle
ground for interpreting the Second Amendment,“that individuals have a right to own a
gun, but it is subject to reasonable government regulation”(“Supreme Court”). It
supported ParkePfi endorsement of the individual right model, but did not approve of the
test that that court had put forward because it believed that it needed to be more flexible,
that it “could call into question the validity of long-standing federal firearm laws, such as
restrictions on the possession of machine guns”(Halstead 15). The Solicitor General
proposed that an intermediate standard of scrutiny should be used that would weigh the
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reasonableness of the standard in question and also take into account the burden or injury
suffered as a result of its enactment(Halstead 15).
Oral argument for the case took place on March 18, 2008, and it became apparent
from the justices’ comments and questions during this session that an outcome supporting
an individual right to bear arms would be likely, and that the outcome would be split
along the Court’s typical ideological lines—the more conservative justices supporting the
individual rights viewpoint and the less conservative in disagreement, favoring a
collective rights inteipretation. Chief Justice John Roberts was the first to make his view
that the Second Amendment gives an individual right to bear arms apparent by begging
the question of Mr. Walter Dellinger, “If it [the right] is limited to State militias, why
would they say ‘the right of the people’? In other words, why wouldn't they say ‘state
militias have the right to keep arms’?”(Oyez). Justice Antonin Scalia, too, made his
support for the individual right apparent through certain comments such as his refusal to
accept the argument that, if the District’s regulations were to be stmck down, then
machine guns and armor-piercing bullets would be allowed. He also pointed to the
natural law tradition in support of a right for self-defense as espoused by Willliam
Blackstone and Joseph Story.
Justice Samuel Alito, while less outspoken than some, also showed an inclination
towards ruling the Gun Ban unconstitutional in his lack of belief that the city council in
the District of Columbia “actually considered what sort of weapon is appropriate for self
defense”(Oyez). Justice Anthony Kennedy, typically the swing vote on the Court made
his position very clear that he would iiile for the individual right to bear arms because he
believed the individual has a right to self-defense. He thought that the framers of the
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Amendment would have considered it so as well, so that people then could defend
themselves from “hostile Indian tribes and outlaws, wolves and bears and grizzlies and
things like that” (Oyez). He considered the preamble to the Amendment as simply a
reaffirmation of the importance of militias. Justice Clarence Thomas, although silent at
Heller ^ oral argument, could be predicted to side with Heller because of his statement in
his concurring opinion in Printz v. United States(1997)that “marshalling an impressive
array ot historical evidence, a growing body of scholarly commentary indicates that the
‘right to keep and bear arms' is, as the amendment’s text suggests, a personal right”
(Epstein and Walker 402).
On the other hand, the other four Justices, John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and David Hackett Souter, seemed to indicate that they would
preter a ruling for the District. Justice Stevens pointed out that the British right from
which the American right descended was not individual, but limited in scope to
Protestants, saying this was “a group right and...limited”(Oyez). Justice Ginsburg also
pointed to these origins as a reason not to strike legislative restrictions such as the
District’s. Justice Souter showed his favor for the collective right by making it clear that
he thought of “bearing arms” as a pmely military term, not one that would refer to using
guns for personal purposes. Justice Breyer indicated in his questioning of Mr. Alan Gura
that he considered the District’s handgun ban to be a reasonable response to crime in the
area (Oyez).
As oral argument would indicate, on June 26, 2008, the Court handed down its
ruling for the case, with five justices in support of Heller: opinion author Justice Scalia,
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, and Justice Kennedy. Opposing the
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decision were Justices Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter. These four all joined in
two dissenting opinions, authored by Justices Stevens and Breyer. Both majority and
dissenting opinions addressed corresponding aspects of the Amendment—its language,
sentence stmcture, historical context, and of the correct role of court precedent and the
appropriate outcome for the District’s regulations, yet reached conflicting conclusions.
The Court ruled that “the Second Amendment protects an individual right to
possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that firearm for
traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home”(Oyez). Justice
Scalia begins his defense of this position by looking at the Amendment’s text itself. He
considers the relationship between the Amendment’s preface and its operating clause and
concludes that “the former does not limit the latter grammatically, but rather announces a
pui*pose” {Heller 3). In this he is in accord with other individual right proponents like
Leonard Levy, who mentioned that an aimed populace caused militias to be possible, not
that the right depends on militia service(Levy 135).
To reach the conclusion that the right is individual, Justice Scalia examines the
operating clause in detail to determine its purpose. He notes that the phrase “the people
referred to “all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset,” thus
conferring an individual right, similar in usage to other Constitutional provisions
employing the phrase {Heller 6). He also considers the language of the right itself, “to
keep and bear Arms,” and looks at the meanings of the words in this phrase as they would
have been understood historically. He concludes that “Arms” held the same meaning
historically as it does today, that it referred then as it does now to weapons in general and
not exclusively those linked to military use (7-8). Likewise, he also contends that to
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keep" and “to bear" as they appear in the Second Amendment also mean what their face
value might convey, that one might be in possession of arms and that one might carry
such arms, in capacities unrelated to maintenance of a militia.
Justice Scalia refers to the Brief for Professors of Linguistics and English
(referred to as Linguists’ Brief) that was filed in support of the Petitioners, in his
discussion of the Amendment's text. However, in his dissent, Justice Stevens uses the
points in the Linguists' Brief to propose that the Amendment’s text supports an
individual right limited by its relationship to militia service. For example, he argues that
to “bear arms” in fact “was most frequently used in the military context.” To refute this.
Justice Scalia points out that when used in this manner, the phrase was always followed
by the preposition “against," which it obviously is not in the Second Amendment. Thus
its definition is not limited to this context {Heller 12-13).
Justice Scalia then cites the history of the right to bear arms as supporting that the
operative clause confers an individual right. He uses the arguments often cited by
individual right scholars in support of their claim. Like Vandercoy (cited earlier), Scalia
looks to the political history of the right in England in particular and also Blackstone’s
commentary on it to show that the right, while not unlimited by any restrictions, was not
limited exclusively to its militial role {Heller 19-22).
The next section of the majority opinion focuses particularly on the relationship
between the prefatory and operative clauses and shows how it supports the claim that the
two act together as a coherent whole, but that the latter is not dependent upon the former
for its meaning. The Court first notes that, as the Parker Court also argued, “the term
‘militia’ refers to all able-bodied men, as opposed to state and congressionally-regulated

42

military forces described in the Militia Clauses of the Constitution,” and also that the
phrase "security of a free state" meant "security of a free polity," not security of each of
the several States as the dissent” argues {Heller 22-24).
Then the Court contends that the two clauses fit well together because, at the time
the Amendment was created, the Antifederalists feared that a strong national government
would have the capability to disarm militias of the type comprised of the general
populace, which they viewed as essential to the “security of a free State.” They thus
created the Second Amendment as a measure of ensuring the federal government would
be unable to do this through abridging individuals’ rights to arms {Heller 25), The Court
also cites “analogous arms-bearing rights in state constitutions that preceded and
immediately followed adoption of the Second Amendment” as confirming the validity of
its interpretation (27-30). These laws, in addition to what little is known about the
Amendment’s drafting history support the individual right stance, says Justice Scalia. He
points out that during the drafting process, proposals for the Amendment by three
different states explicitly mentioned an individual right to bear arms(30-32).
The Court then studies “how the Second Amendment was interpreted from
immediately after its ratification through the end of the 19‘*’ century” {Heller 52). It
declares that the post-ratification commentary shows that “three important founding-era
legal scholars interpreted the Second Amendment in published writings. All three
understood it to protect an individual’s right unconnected with militia service”(32-33).
One of the scholars, St. George Tucker, gave a version of Blackstone’s Commentaries
that “conceived of the Blackstonian right as necessary for self-defense. He equates that
right, absent the religious and class-based restrictions, with the Second Amendment”

43

(33). Tucker, like individual right scholars Vandercoy, Kates, Lund, and Malcolm,
believes that Blackstone's ideology supports the personal right to arms. The second post
ratification scholar the Court mentions is William Rawle, who “regarded the English
game laws as violating the right codified in the Second Amendment” and “clearly
differentiated between the people's right to bear arms and their service in a militia,” thus
indicating that he believed the right to extend to individuals absent militial ties (35).
Finally, the Court also mentions Joseph Story, whose influential Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States, published in 1833, describe the English right to arms as
a personal right, and then links the English right to the American right in the Second
Amendment (35).
Next Justice Scalia gives further perspective on the right’s interpretation

as an

individual one by looking at pre-Civil War case law, post-Civil War legislation, and postCivil War commentary. He employs arguments from S. Halbrook’s scholarship in the
amicus brief from the Institute for Justice in support of the Respondent that noted that
when given their freedom, former slaves and indeed all citizens held the right to keep and
bear arms for their own personal protection and that of their families and homes {Heller
42-43). He closes this part of his examination into the history of the right by describing
how all “late-19‘^-century legal scholar[sl that we [the Court] have read interpreted the
Second Amendment to secure an individual right unconnected with militia service”(44).
He places particular importance on the work of Thomas Cooley, a famous judge and
professor who wrote “a massively popular 1868 Treatise on Constitutional Limitations”
(44). Cooley “understood the right not as connected to militia service, but as securing the
militia by ensuring a populace familiar with arms”(44).
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In its justification of considering the right to bear arms an individual right. Justice
Scalia said that the Court then had to consider “whether any of our precedents forecloses
the conclusions vve have reached about the meaning of the Second Amendment”{Heller
47). The Court concludes that this is not the case for either United States v. Cndkshank,
“which held that the Second Amendment does not by its own force apply to anyone other
than the federal government, nor Presser v. Illinios:
1 W)hich held that the right to keep and bear arms was not violated by a
law that prohibited groups of men from associating together as military
organizations and from drilling or parading with arms in cities and towns
unless authorized by law (Halstead 18).
Neither of these precedents refutes the individual right interpretation, nor does United
States V. Miller, which the Court interpreted similarly to the Emerson court in concluding
that its only effect on the right was to limit the types of protected weapons to those used
by militias and thus for lawful purposes {Heller 53).
The Court also noted that Miller's, precedent supports the fact that, “like most
rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited” {Heller 5A). Miller
limited protected weapons to those that were of common use at the time. The Heller
Court also contends that its mling for the individual right should not have the effect of
invalidating any and every gun control statute, but should allow for some to stay in place.
such as:
Longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places
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such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions
and qualifications on tlie commercial sale of arms (54-55).
Thus, the Court proceeded to rule the District’s Gun Ban unconstitutional,
because it did not merely restrict, but in effect prohibited a category of arms that should
be allowed for personal use for self-defense. As a result of this, the Court saw no need to
establish a standard of scrutiny for gun control regulations in this case, because the
prohibition would fail “under any of the standards of scmtiny that we have applied to
enumerated constitutional rights"(56).
In his dissenting opinion, however. Justice Breyer disagreed with the majority’s
opinion that the Court need not establish a standard of scrutiny for gun control
regulations in the case at hand. He argued for an “interest-balancing” approach to Second
Amendment cases that “would take into account both of the statute’s effects upon the
competing interests and the existence of any clearly superior less restrictive alternative”
{Heller). He contends that this should be the standard of review used if the right to bear
arms is to be construed as providing for an individual’s right to bear arms for personal
use. However, like Justice Stevens, he believes that the Amendment in fact does confer
an individual right, but only so far as exercise of the right is linked to militia service.
Justice Stevens in his dissent mirrored the type of extensive research undertaken
by Justice Scalia, yet he reached the conclusion that the Amendment does not give the
individual citizen the right to keep and bear arms apait from the relation of such an act to
militia service. He also concluded that when the Second Amendment right is correctly
viewed as such, that the District’s laws should not in fact be invalidated, because it had
“been an understood that legislatures may regulate the civilian use and misuse of firearms
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so long as they do not interfere with the preservation of a well-regulated militia” {Heller
- Stevens' Dissent 45). Changing this type of standard he says “leaves for future cases
the formidable task of defining the scope of permissible regulations”(45).
The discrepancies between the majority and minority opinions in this case bear a
strong resemblance to the points of contention between tlie Fifth Circuit Emerson ruling
and the Ninth Circuit Silveira decision. I became aware of the//e//er opinion’s striking
similarities to Emerson when I spoke briefly with Mr. Heller and his lawyers outside of
the Supreme Court just after the Court announced its decision. Mr. Dane von
Breichenruchardt, president of the Bill of Rights Foundation and an advisor to Mr. Heller
noted that this was one of the opinion's aspects he foimd most notable after an initial
reading.
The discrepancies in the opinions also display in full view what a rift had existed
among scholars as to which model the Second Amendment did in fact support, and also
the resultant extraordinary amount of scholarship in existence on the issue. And while
now, post-Heller, little debate is possible as to which interpretive model it is
constitutional to use since the Court declared the individual right to arms for personal
use, other aspects of the Amendment’s future application still are imcertain. A prime
example of this uncertainty lies with the lack of a standard of scrutiny with which to
consider gun regulations. Another exists in regard to the fact that the Court did not
address specifically whether or how, if at all, the Second Amendment should be applied
to state gun control measures. Since Washington is a federal enclave it was able to avoid
clarifying this issue altogether, leaving the Amendment’s relationship to the states to be
determined.
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CHAPTER V: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

While the Court in Heller gave a conclusive answer to debate regarding which
interpretive model of the Second Amendment should be used, it left several other
questions unanswered. Some scholars believe that the Court should have gone further
than it did to clarify how the Amendment, interpreted as such, should be applied in
practice. On the other hand, some scholars believe that the Court actually went too far in
its interpretation of the Amendment, that the opinion was as much an expression of
political ideology as of Constitutional theory. However, regardless of the decision’s
merit, it does have implications for how courts across the country will treat cases
challenging gun regulations on Second Amendment grounds. Yet even so, the extent to
which applying the Heller precedent will actually change trends of upholding federal gun
regulations currently appears minimal.
The reaction of legal scholars to the Court’s decision in //e//er has been mixed.
Libertarian lawyer Robert Levy, who sponsored Heller’s case from the beginning, of
course believes that the Court did in fact get it right. He stressed the importance of the
Court’s protection of the individual’s right to bear arms given in the Second Amendment.
While some believe that the Court actually usurped legislative authority through its
ruling. Levy believes that this is not the case, that the rights the Court defines are
constitutional and are thus “not rights consigned to the legislature”(Liptak, “Ruling”). He
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declared that the Court made it clear that “the District may not attempt to solve its crime
problems by vitdating the rights of law-abiding citizens”(Barnes).
Ho\ve\ er, some conservative judges actually disagree with Levy’s support for the
Court's ruling, notably two prominent appeals court judges. Judge Harvie Wilkinson HI
of the Fourth Circuit and Judge Richard A. Posner of the Seventh Circuit. They believe
that Justice Scalia's opinion “is illegitimate, activist, poorly reasoned and fueled by
politics rather than principle"(Liptak, “Ruling”). They compare the decision in//e//er to
a “right-wing version of Roe v. Wade, tlie 1973 decision that identified a constitutional
right to abortion"(Liptak, “Ruling"), a contention which Levy rejects because the right to
bear arms is actually mentioned in the Bill of Rights, and abortion is not. Judge
Wilkinson believes that tlie majority and dissenting opinions’ analyses “fought into
overtime to a draw," but that Scalia's opinion won out merely due to the ideological
balance of the Court (Liptak, “Ruling).
Heller also faced criticism for the merit of its historical analysis. Historian Jack
Rakove said that in fact “neither of the two main opinions in Heller would pass muster as
serious historical writing"(Liptak, “Ruling”). Also, Harvard law professor MarkTushnet,
who wrote a book on the Amendment said that “the debate ‘showed why lawyers
shouldn’t be historians,’ noting that Scalia and Stevens each wrote as though ‘there’s
only one way to view what happened in 1791’”(Barnes).
Interestingly enough, with some conservatives criticizing the mling, some liberals
actually support it. For example, liberal law professors Laurence H. Tribe and Sanford
Levinson both believe that the Roberts Court interpreted the right to keep and bear arms
correctly, possibly in spite of their policy preferences. Also, some liberal lawyers and law
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professors \ ic\\ fiuure ircaiment of Heller's ruling as a possible means of eventually
finding ccMisiiuniiMuil protection for “rights not specifically mentioned in the
Consiiiiiiit>n.‘* jiossilTly those of abortion and gay rights (Liptak, “Few”). They do so in
their consideration of how the Second Amendment might become incorporated to apply
to the states in adLlition to the federal government (Liptak, “Few).
,\n important ciuestiim that the Court did not answer in Heller, is whether or not it
bclie\ es that the Secoin.1 Amendment should in fact apply to the states as well. The Court
was not forced to answer this question because the laws it examined were only tliose of
the District t>f C'olumbia, a federal enclave and thus governed by federal law directly, in
this case the Bill ot' Rights. IVIost individual rights provided for in the Bill of Rights have
at some point been ruled to apply to the states in addition to tlie federal government
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Previous Court rulings do
not support the incorporation of the right to bear arms: however, now that the Court has
defined the right as individual, most scholars believe that this will occur in time (Liptak,
“Few").

The liberal scholars mentioned before are hopeful that the Second Amendment
might be incorporated in a new way, through the Fourteenth Amendment’s “privileges
and immunities" clause, rather than due process. Courts have only qualified rights
specifically mentioned in the Constitution or Bill of Rights as being incorporated to the
states through due process. Past Court precedent has very narrowly defined the
Fourteenth Amendment's privileges and immunities, not currently allowing tor new
additions to the rights it protects. However these scholars point out that “there is some
evidence that its framers specifically wanted it to apply to allow freed slaves to have guns
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lo defend ilienisel\es." and ihai iisiiiii this clause as such would make sense with its
wording ( Lipiak. "lew”). Thus, if ilic Second Amendment were incorporated in this new
way. they are hopeful that other rights might eventually be as well (Liptak. “Few”).
.Another signit'icani question that ilie Court left unanswered pertains to what
standard of scmtiiu should properly be used to determine whether a gun control
rcmilation is in v iolation of the individual ridu to bear arms. Justice Scalia believed that
clarifying such a standard was unnecessary in Heller because the District’s complete ban
on handguns w ould fail under any standard of scrutiny pertaining to regulation of
protected firearms. I le also said iliat "since this case represents this court’s tirst in-depth
ex amination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire
field" {Heller 63). Leaving out the identification of a standard may even have been
inHucntial in keeping Justice Kennedy with the majority,"who seemed at oral argument
lo be sLipp(.>rii ve ol the individual right, but woiiied about standards (Barnes). The Court
did stale its rejection of both a rational basis scrutiny and an interest-balancing inquiry as
espoused by Justice Breyer in his dissent {Heller).
I'herel'orc. with no real guidance as to how courts should rule on regulations that
did not completely prohibit guns, there was uncertainty immediately following//tT/er as
to whai the ruling would look like in application. What real impact will

have on

the way lower courts will handle Second Amendment challenges to federal gun control
laws, and will it be much of a change from their past treatment of them? Many scholars
predict that it would not in fact hold many different practical implications, due to its lack
of a standard ol scrutiny. Without the Supreme Court defining how the lower courts
should protect the iudividuaTs right to arms, the decision is left up to the courts
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thernsclvcs lo determine. Glenn H. Reynolds and Brannon P. Denning believe that, when
the qucsticm of w hat the eouns would do with gun rights cases inthefaceofHe//er,the
answer will he -not miieh”(Reynolds and Denning 2038). They argue this because, in the
past, federal appellate courts have shown *‘a significant hostility toward individual rights
arguments and a surprisingly deep investment in their own caselaw, despite its rather
tenuous anchor in the Supreme Court's decisions"(Reynolds and Denning 2038). If this
is so, then the lower courts might likely interpret //e//er in the narrowest way possible,
even reading it to stand for “the proposition that anytliing less than an absolute ban could
pass muster"(Reynolds and Denning 2039).
Currently, the expectations that Heller would not have an extraordinary practical
effect on the way courts handle challenges to gun control regulations have proven true.
Lower federal courts have considered Second Amendment challenges to gun control
regulations in over 80 eases, and just as before Heller, have upheld the national laws with
but one exception. Two judges struck down part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act, which “says that people accused of child pornography offenses must be
prohibited from possessing guns while they await trial”(H.R.4472[109thl: Adam Walsh
Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006). They did so partially because a “fundamental
constitutional right" was at stake: however,“that provision may well have been
unconstitutional as a matter of due process even before Heller, as it seems to impose a
punishment before conviction"(Liptak,“Few”).
Although Heller's effect on gun regulations might be negligible, it has, however,
opened the door to new cases that could lead to a change in Second Amendment
application. Given new hope, pro-gun advocates have already begun to bring new
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challenges against regulaior\ laws in hopes of gaining fiinher ground. For example,
Heller and others lia\e e\en challenged the new laws the District put into place postHellcr as also being »n crl\ restrictive and thus violating the individual right to arms
(Gibeaut 24). .\noilicr prime target has been the city of Chicago's regulations on guns,
which are \er\ similar to the nisirict’s former Gun Bmi. Litigants against it have hopes
that it could perhaits lie a \csscl through which the Court could incorporate the Second
Amendment to ajiply to slate and local regulations as well as federal (Gibeaut 22). Future
litigation will probably also lead the Court to suggest a standard of scrutiny with which to
evaluate the const iiuiiimal its of gun control laws. As for now. however, as law professor
Adam Winkler said, "the 1 Idler case is a landmark decision that has not changed very
much at all"(Uptak. "Lew").
Winkler's comment is a fair assessment of the paradox of the//e//er decision. It is
obvious that Heller is important in what it means to the evolution of tlie understanding of
the right to bear arms by defining the meaning of the Second Amendment. In its ruling
the Court takes into account arguments on both sides of the centuries-old debate on the
right, and definitively declares that the Second Amendment protects the individual right
to arms. It sees this right as separate iVom. but in harmony with and support of, the
protection the Amendment gives to militias from government disarmament. Some
scholars. like Levinson, argue though "that Heller will more likely than not turn out to be
of no signii icance to anyone but constitutional theorists”(Liptak,“Few ). Heller s
greatest importance lies in its meaning to Second Amendment constitutional law, because
its application causes little change to previous trends of courts to uphold gun control
sialiiies.
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